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1 Introduction
In the last couple of decades, the relationship between bilateral donors and multilateral financial
institutions on the one hand and developing country governments on the other has been plagued
by disagreements over the economic policies to be pursued by the latter. These conflicts orig-
inated in the 1970s with the former actors’ incipient perception of a micro-macro paradox of
economic development: rates of return on individual aid projects were generally deemed satisfac-
tory whereas the growth performance of the recipients in many cases were not. The blame was
put on the policy framework in developing countries, where governments in many cases clearly
had followed unsustainable macroeconomic policies while at the same time over-extending the
public sector. This was only reluctantly conceded by some of these governments, and others
refused to mend their ways in the face of mounting problems. However, during the debt crisis of
the 1980s developing countries saw their ability to borrow internationally severely restricted, real
interest rates rose, and arrears on debt payments mounted. Such external financing problems
forced quite a few governments to turn to the multilateral financial institutions and bilateral
donors as substitute sources of capital. To provide funds, these actors demanded policy changes
in return. The reluctance to reform on the part of governments receiving public external funding
resulted in a proliferation of conditions attached to both grants and loans.
The track record of conditionality in terms of instigating comprehensive and lasting reforms
of policies is far from impressing.1 This has lead some observers to advocate local “ownership”
of policies, i.e., that changes should not be forced through by foreigners and should only be
supported if the political will to reform is present domestically. The ongoing democratisation
process in developing countries have probably strengthened the hand of this camp as it is more
diﬃcult to defend compelling democratically elected governments to adopt policies that are not
on their own agenda. Figure 1 shows regional averages for groups of developing and transition
countries over the last twenty-five years.2 We see that in most regions, there is a downward
1Empirical studies of conditionality include Mosley, Harrigan, and Toye (1991), Killick (1995, 1998), Devarajan,
Dollar, and Holmgren (2001a), and the World Bank (1998). I return to this issue in the conclusion.
2The starting period of 1976-77 approximately corresponds to the onset of what Huntington (1991) has termed
“the third wave” of democratisation.
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trend, implying that the degree of democracy has increased.3 The downward turn started earlier
in Latin America than in the other regions, and is most pronounced in Eastern Europe and
Central Asia after the end of the Cold War. In the most aid-dependent region, Sub-Saharan
Africa, the average started out at 5.5 before increasing slightly over the next decade (to 5.9 in
1985-86). It then started to fall with a pace that fastened notably following the fall of the Berlin
Wall, reaching 4.4 in 2000-01.
[Figure 1 about here]
Yet, even those who advocate ownership of domestic policies will have a hard time arguing that
all conflicts will go away with the focus on “partnership” between donors and recipients. Indeed,
even as it speaks of ownership and partnership, the World Bank recommends aid selectivity, i.e.,
concentrating aid on recipients pursuing “good” policies.4 This implicitly implies that there are
some countries with governments choosing “bad” policies - at least from the donors’ perspective.
With the recent wave of democratisation in recipient countries, it has become more likely that
governments and policies in these countries change over time. Aid selectivity thus requires a
greater understanding of the political economy of recipient countries in order to be able to
predict the impact of aid on the domestic political equilibrium that determines what policies will
be pursued. In this paper, I contribute to accumulating such knowledge by analysing a game
between a donor and a recipient government with conflicting policy objectives when the type
of government is determined through elections. I show that donor influence over outcomes is
feasible if it possesses a large enough budget compared to the recipient. However, if influence is
achieved, this tends to reduce the likelihood that the political alternative most closely aligned
with the donor wins the election.
None of the few existing papers that formally model the political economy of aid covers this
ground. Pedersen (1997), Svensson (2000a), and Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller (2003) all look at
how interest groups may aﬀect the impact of aid, whereas Boone (1996) studies a bureaucratic-
3I have calculated these averages from data obtained from Freedom House (at
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm), which publishes the most commonly used indices of de-
mocratic rights. Countries are ranked on a 1-7 scale on political and civil rights, with 1 being the best (i.e., most
democratic) score (for more information on these rankings, see Gastil 1991). I have taken the average of these
two scores for each country in each period. The regional averages are the simple averages of these.
4See World Bank (2002) for a recent statement of these views.
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authoritarian model of policy determination where the share of the population taken into account
varies across regimes.5 By investigating the eﬀect of aid on election outcomes, I extend this
literature in a new direction.6
The model is set up in section 2 and analysed in section 3. Sections 4 and 5 contain the
results with respect to the eﬀect of aid on the electoral outcome in the recipient country. Section
6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Conditionality may be viewed as a contracting approach to aid and policy, with foreign economic
assistance being the payment made to recipient country governments in return for agreeing to
pursue a certain set of policies. Given the mixed record of conditionality, I prefer to use a game-
theoretic approach to the interaction between donors and recipients in which each party chooses
its best strategy given the other party’s choices. More specifically, the vehicle for analysing the
electoral politics of foreign aid in recipient countries is the budgetary game analysed in more
detail in Hagen (2002, 2004). The game is simple, but rich in implications for the potential
impact of aid on election outcomes in recipient countries.
The actors are a donor agency (D) and a recipient country government. The latter can be
of two diﬀerent types, R and S, diﬀerentiated by their preferences over the consumption vector
G = {g1, g2} in the recipient country:
F j (G) = βj ln g1 +
¡
1− βj
¢
ln g2, j = R,S, β
j ∈ (0, 1) . (1)
The donor also has Cobb-Douglas preferences defined over G, the weight attached to the
utility of g1 being α, and a fixed aid budget for the recipient in question, A. Moreover, it cannot
tax the recipient, so the funds allocated to spending on each good must be non-negative. Similar
5Mayer and Raimondos-Møller (2003) use a median voter model to study the political economy of foreign aid
in the donor country, which is a quite diﬀerent issue.
6A further distinction between the model presented here and the work of Boone (1996) and Pedersen (1997)
is that they do not consider the donor as a strategic actor.
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restrictions apply to the recipient country government, which has a total budget of B.7 The
combined budget of the two players is thus C = A+B.
I choose units so that the prices of the goods are both unity.8 For any combination of
budgetary allocations by the donor (ak) and the government (bk), the consumption of good k is
then
gk = ak + bk, k = 1, 2. (2)
It is well-known that Cobb-Douglas preferences yield constant budget shares for each good
which are equal to their weights in the objective function. The “first-best” allocations of the
actors - the allocation that they would have chosen if they could dictate how C should be spent
- is therefore
GD∗ =
©
gD∗1 , g
D∗
2
ª
= {αC, (1− α)C} (3a)
Gj∗ =
©
g
j∗
1 , g
j∗
2
ª
=
©
βjC,
¡
1− βj
¢
C
ª
, j = R,S. (3b)
Both g1 and g2 can be thought of as collective goods for the players. However, the benefits
of these are judged diﬀerently if the weight attached to the utility of g1 varies among the actors.
As this is the most realistic case, a conflict of interest is assumed.9 More specifically, I always
assume βR > βS. The donor is first assumed to put more emphasis on the supply of g1 than an
R-government, i.e., α > βR. Given the conditionality debacle that has characterised North-South
relations since the onset of the debt crisis, readers may then for the sake of concreteness think
7The non-negativity assumption is perhaps a bit more restrictive for the recipient, but it ensures symmetry
between the players. Moreover, it is empirically reasonable: empirical studies of fungibility rarely find that an
increase in aid results in lower total spending on the activity in question. Given the assumption, one could think
of the transfers analysed here as project aid, or, even more precisely, aid in kind: once D has allocated funds for
some purpose in the recipient country, these are turned into actual units of goods and services. However, one
could easily extend this to programme aid as long as the recipient’s ability to tax or transfer resources across
budget categories is limited relative to D’s budget.
8As long as prices are constant, all the results in this paper generalise straightforwardly to other kinds of
separable homothetic preferences and more than two goods, c.f. Hagen (2004).
9According to Killick (1998: 171), for instance, “Our country survey attested to the frequency with which dif-
ferences of interest [between international financial institutions and governments in recipient countries] occurred.”
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of R as short-hand for “reform” and S as standing for “status-quo”. The case of a “moderate”
donor - βR > α > βS - is considered afterwards.10 It turns out that even though the political
impact of aid is much more complex in the second case, the general lessons are much the same.
3 Nash-Equilibria
The donor and the government are assumed to play a simultaneous move game.11 Given (2)
and (3), one can construct the players’ “first-best” strategies from gj∗k = ak + bk. This means
that given the other player’s strategy, the budgetary allocations that achieves the “first-best”
outcome of D and the two types of recipient are simply
A∗ = {a∗1, a∗2} =
©
gD∗1 − b1, gD∗2 − b2
ª
(4a)
BR∗ =
©
bR∗1 , b
R∗
2
ª
=
©
gR∗1 − a1, gR∗2 − a2
ª
(4b)
BS∗ =
©
bS∗1 , b
S∗
2
ª
=
©
gS∗1 − a1, gS∗2 − a2
ª
(4c)
It should now be clear that
©
A∗, BR∗
ª
or
©
A∗, BS∗
ª
, as the case may be, cannot constitute
Nash-equilibrium strategy profiles. By construction these strategies attain a player’s “first-best”
allocation of C, and as these are assumed to be distinct, two players’ “first-best” allocations
cannot be simultaneously realised. The main issue is therefore when one of the players can use
its “first-best” strategy.
Consider the options of D. By the budget constraints, these strategies may be written
as functions of a the other player’s funding of good 1, e.g. A∗ =
©
gD∗1 − b1, A− gD∗1 + b1
ª
.
To ask when A∗ is feasible is to thus ask for which parameter values a∗1 ∈ [0, A] given b1.
Since gD∗1 > g
R∗
1 > g
S∗
1 , it is not optimal for any of the recipient types to spend more than
gD∗1 on g1. The non-negativity constraint on a
∗
1 will therefore never be binding in equilibrium.
Moreover, if A ≥ gD∗1 D can single-handedly ensure that GD∗ is the outcome. Setting a1 = gD∗1
10The case α = βR is not of great interest, for obvious reasons. If, for some reason, α < βS , the outcomes
would be mirror-images of the ones presented below.
11As shown in Hagen (2002, 2004), in the present set-up the order of moves does not matter for outcomes.
Thus, what follows also applies to sequential games.
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means that the optimal response of a type j government is b1 = 0. Therefore, gN1 = g
D∗
1 and
gN2 = A − a1 + b2 = A − gD∗1 + B = C − gD∗1 = gD∗2 . Rewriting the condition A ≥ gD∗1 as
A ≥
¡ α
1−α
¢
B ≡ A we see that this equilibrium results if D has a large enough budget relative to
the recipient.
Once A < gD∗1 , the influence D has over the outcome is diminished, as it needs the recipient
to contribute to the provision of g1 if its “first-best” allocation is to be realised. However, since
they find gD∗1 too high for their tastes, neither government type has an incentive to do so. As
long as gD∗1 > A ≥ g
j∗
1 , D will find it optimal to spend its entire budget on g1 and the optimal
response of j will be to spend only on g2. For such a parameter configuration, when g1 = A and
g2 = B, both parties consider the good for which they have the strongest relative preference to
be undersupplied and so they will not move away from the extreme strategies of spending only
on this good. Hence, the Nash-equilibrium outcome is GN = {A,B}, which is an allocation
intermediate to the “first-best” allocations of the two actors.
By now, it should come as no surprise that when A < gj∗1 , the outcome is a mirror image of
the first type of equilibrium described, with the recipient calling the shots. D is no longer able
to oversupply g1 from j’s perspective, or, what amounts to the same thing with only two goods,
j can now unilaterally bring about Gj∗. If it chooses b1 = B − gj∗2 , j knows that D’s response
will be a1 = A, and so gN1 = A + B − g
j∗
2 = C − g
j∗
2 = g
j∗
1 and g
N
2 = g
j∗
2 . Rewriting A < g
j∗
1
to derive the second critical value for the aid budget relative to the government’s budget, we
find that it is A <
³
βj
1−βj
´
B ≡ Aj. Note that this condition depends on the type of government
playing the game with D. Given the assumption α > βR > βS, A > A
R
> A
S
. That is, D
starts to have some influence over the final allocation at a lower relative budget when it is facing
an S-government. This is the key to the potential impact of aid on the election result in the
recipient country that I will analyse in the next two sections.
The results derived so far is summarised in the following proposition:
Proposition 1
When α > βR > βS, there are three regions with diﬀerent Nash-equilibria of the budgetary
game between the donor and the recipient delimited by critical values of the relative budgets of
the players. The equilibrium budgetary allocations and outcomes are
7
i) A ∈
³
0, A
j
i
:
©©
aN1 , a
N
2
ª
,
©
bN1 , b
N
2
ªª
=
©{A, 0} ,©βjC −A, ¡1− βj¢Cªª ,GN = Gj∗;
ii) A ∈
³
A
j
, A
i
:
©©
aN1 , a
N
2
ª
,
©
bN1 , b
N
2
ªª
= {{A, 0} , {0, B}} ,GN = {A,B} ;
iii) A > A :
©©
aN1 , a
N
2
ª
,
©
bN1 , b
N
2
ªª
= {{αC, (1− α)C −B} , {0, B}} ,GN = GD∗.
That is, the degree of influence that each player has is a weakly monotonicly increasing
function of the relative resources that it commands, a player being in full control if it is possible
for it to unilaterally finance the optimal level of supply of the good for which it has the highest
first-best budgetary share. Hence, donor influence is feasible if it has pockets deep enough.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 maps out the results described in Proposition 1. It also illustrates that we do not
have to worry about whether the recipient government would like to exercise its option of refusing
to accept foreign assistance if it is made worse oﬀ by it. Because D and the government types do
not concur in the optimal distribution of resources, it is conceivable that D’s oﬀer would entail
such a “bad” distribution of resources from the perspective of a recipient government that the
extra income does not compensate for it. However, at low levels of aid, where one could suspect
that the transfer could be inadequate to compensate for any “distortion” in outcomes due to
donor influence, D has in fact no leverage. And when D provides resources at a level suﬃcient
to have an impact on outcomes, the government is more than compensated by the increase in
the budget available for spending on goods 1 and 2.
4 Domestic Political Equilibrium and Aid
Let us now assume that the government is chosen through democratic elections. That is, before
the aid game starts, there is an election in which voters vote for either R or S. This choice is
determined by comparing the equilibrium allocations with the two governments in power. Hence
aid will aﬀect the domestic political equilibrium if D influences outcomes. Table 1 summarises
the results, given A and the government’s type.
[Table 1 about here]
There is a continuum of voters of measure 1. They have utility functions U i (G) which are
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analogous to the objective functions of the government and the donor, the weight attached to the
utility of consuming good 1 being νi ∈ [ν, ν] ⊂ [0, 1]. As already mentioned, voters are assumed
to be forward looking and thus to evaluate outcomes under the two potential governments before
casting their ballott. With a continuum of voters, voting is sincere as the probability of aﬀecting
the election outcome is zero. Hence, voter i votes for R if U i
¡
GN (R)
¢
> U i
¡
GN (S)
¢
, where
GN (j) is the Nash-equilibrium outcome of a game between D and a government of type j. If
U i
¡
GN (R)
¢
= U i
¡
GN (S)
¢
, i flips a fair coin to decide how to cast his vote.
Let us first analyse what would happen if the recipient country receives no aid. Lemma 1 is
useful in this respect:12
Lemma 1
If A = 0, there exists a voter that is indiﬀerent between the two political alternatives,13 i.e.,
defined by U I
¡
GN (R)
¢
≡ U I
¡
GN (S)
¢
. The indiﬀerent voter I has a weight on the utility of g1
equal to νI0 =
ln(1−βS)−ln(1−βR)
[lnβR−lnβS]+[ln(1−βS)−ln(1−βR)]
∈
¡
βS, βR
¢
.
The result is intuitive. All voters for which νi ≤ βS of course prefer S to R. Likewise, if
νi ≥ βR one votes for R. Hence, the indiﬀerent voter must be an individual whose preferences
are intermediate to the ideology of the political alternatives.14 As should be clear from Table
1, Lemma 1 still applies when A < A
S
. This is simply due to D being without influence over
outcomes regardless of the type of government it faces.
Let us start the analysis of situations where A ≥ AS by applying the median voter theorem.
The conditions ensuring that the median voter is decisive are clearly satisfied here (in particular,
preferences are single-peaked) even though he cannot choose his most preferred levels of provision
of the collective goods. Of course, the standard median voter model is unrealistic for national
elections, three notable features of which are a fixed set of alternatives (parties or candidates with
party labels), uncertainty about voter preferences, and voter uncertainty about what policies will
result from the election of a particular alternative. However, it is useful in the current setting
because it will demonstrate the possible impact of aid on elections in the clearest possible manner.
12Lemma 1 and the lemmas, propositions, and corollaries that follow are proven in the appendix.
13For the sake of simplicity, I speak of this voter in the singular even though there is likely to be a group of
voters with the same preferences.
14I assume that the distribution of voter preferences is non-degenerate and, moreover, such that not all voters
prefer one of the political alternatives.
9
Moreover, I will add the second feature to the first below.
If the preferences of the median voter are such that νM < νI0, S wins the election if A = 0.
On the other hand, for νM > νI0 R is the winner. Only in the unlikely case ν
M = νI0 would the
outcome of the election be indeterminate if D was not present in the recipient country. Yet it
is immediate from Table 1 that for A ≥ AR, all voters are indiﬀerent between R and S because
the outcome is the same regardless of the choice of government. This is so even if the election
would produce a clear-cut winner in the absence of foreign aid. Hence, in the case of A ≥ AR
and νM > νI0, assuming the median voter resolves his indiﬀerence by flipping a fair coin the
entry of D turns a certain victory for an R-government into a mere 50-50 chance of winning!
The giving of aid, however, can even turn the domestic political equilibrium upside down when
A ∈
h
A
S
, A
R
i
.
To see this, we must find the indiﬀerent voter for these levels of the aid budget. As will
become clear, in this region his identity is a function A that I denote by νI (A). When A = A
S
,
νI (A) is still equal to νI0, since in this borderline case S achieves its optimal allocation even
though it has to choose the extreme strategy b1 = 0. For A > A
S
, the calculation is complicated
by the fact that it is no longer only the ideology of the two alternatives that matter. S is then at
a corner solution in the post-election game, and the level of A therefore plays a role. The problem
is best solved by defining a “virtual” opponent of R, that is, a government with preferences such
that the outcomes produced under an S-government equal its “first-best” outcomes. νI (A) can
then be calculated in the manner used for deriving Lemma 1. Lemmas 2 and 3 contain the
results.
Lemma 2
For A ∈
h
A
S
, A
R
i
, an S-government is equivalent to a σ-government. A σ-government is
defined by its “first-best” allocation being equal to the Nash-equilibrium outcome under an S-
government, i.e., by Gσ∗ = GN (S). The weight σ attaches to the utility of consumption of g1 is
βσ (A) = AC ∈
£
βS, βR
¤
.
Note that ∂β
σ(A)
∂A > 0: the more aid is given in this range, the higher is g1. Thus, to make
the Nash-equilibrium outcome a “first-best” allocation for σ when A goes up, it must attach a
greater weight to the utility from consuming this good. Moreover, βσ
³
A
S
´
= βS as the Nash-
equilibrium outcome for A = A
S
is GS∗. Similarly, βσ
³
A
R
´
= βR because the final allocation is
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{A,B} = GR∗ when D plays S and A = AR.
Lemma 3
For A ∈
h
A
S
, A
R
i
, the preferences of the indiﬀerent voter are described by the function
νI (A) =
ln(1−βσ)−ln(1−βR)
[lnβR−lnβσ]+[ln(1−βσ)−ln(1−βR)]
.
In the appendix, it is demonstrated that ∂ν
I(A)
∂A > 0, with lim
A→AR
νI (A) = βR. That is, the
identity of the indiﬀerent voter is moved “to the right” as A goes up, and in the limit (in this
range of aid budgets), even a voter with a weight on the utility of g1 equal to β
R is indiﬀerent
between the two types of government! The latter is due to the fact that in the borderline case of
A = A
R
, the outcome is {A,B} regardless of which government is in power. What is happening
is that as A increases, the outcomes under the two types of governments are converging, c.f.
Figure 3. In the end, they are the same and the label of the government does not matter for
outcome-oriented voters. The country is eﬀectively under foreign administration, and domestic
politics therefore is devoid of any real content.
[Figure 3 about here]
If νM ∈
³
νI
³
A
S
´
, νI
³
A
R
´´
, an R-government would have won in the absence of aid.
νI
³
A
S
´
= νI0, which in turn lies between β
S and βR. Therefore, if νM > νI
³
A
S
´
, R would have
been preferred to a S by a majority of the voters if no aid was forthcoming. But with aid, there
exists an aid budget A0 ∈
³
A
S
, A
R
´
such that νM = νI (A0) (since νI
³
A
R
´
= βR, νM < βR, and
∂νI(A)
∂A > 0), c.f. Figure 4. Hence, for A ∈
³
A0, A
R
´
, R will now certainly lose the election!
[Figure 4 about here]
While this need not happen, it is clear that if aid decisively aﬀects the domestic political
equilibrium, it is in this direction. For A ≥ AR, the electoral prospects of the two alternatives
are always identical. If νM < νI
³
A
S
´
, R loses the election ∀A < AR. If νM > νI
³
A
R
´
, R wins
the election when A < A
R
. Finally, as just noted, if νM ∈
³
νI
³
A
S
´
, νI
³
A
R
´´
, R is victorious
as long as A < A0, has a 50% chance of winning at A0, and none for A ∈
³
A0, A
R
´
.
Such an outcome would make D worse oﬀ. Even though it has some influence with an S-
government compared to none with an R-government, outcomes are still better under the latter
from D’s point of view. In Figure 3, it is easily seen that for any A in the region
h
A
S
, A
R
´
,
the point on R’s expansion path, which will be the outcome if it is in power, is closer to the
corresponding point on D’s expansion path than {A,B} is.
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As already mentioned, the median voter model eﬀectively demonstrates the mechanisms at
work here. However, it is more realistic to assume that there is uncertainty about the distribution
of voter preferences, for example because turn-out on election day is random. We can model this
by letting νM be distributed according to M (z), with ∂M(z)∂z ≡ m (z) > 0 ∀z ∈ [ν, ν]. Then the
probability that R wins the election, p, is the probability that νM > νI : p = 1−M
¡
νI
¢
. Let p0
be the probability that R is victorious when A = 0, i.e., p0 = 1 −M
¡
νI0
¢
. From the above, it
follows that
p (A) =



p0, A < A
S
,
p
¡
νI (A)
¢
, A ∈
h
A
S
, A
R
´
,
0.5, A ≥ AR.
(5)
Hence, p (A) has two segments where it is constant, whereas for A ∈
³
A
S
, A
R
´
∂p(A)
∂A =
−m
¡
νI (A)
¢ ∂νI(A)
∂A < 0. The reason p (A) is declining over this particular range is that, as already
mentioned, outcomes are converging for these values of A. More precisely, what is happening is
that outcomes under an S-government (“represented” by σ) are converging to those under an
R-government when A goes up. This benefits S as it moves the indiﬀerent voter closer to R:
someone who was previously indiﬀerent must strictly be preferring an S-government when the
Nash-equilibrium outcome under that type moves closer to its optimal allocation. Hence, the
new indiﬀerent voter must be someone whose preferences are closer to βR, and so the likelihood
that νM < νI (A) rises. The lesson to be had is therefore that in terms of winning the election,
it is advantageous to play the aid game if D has partial influence over the equilibrium allocation
only when you are in power.
It is interesting to compare this result to the ones generated by standard voting models.15
In median voter models with two political alternatives and no uncertainty, there is complete
convergence of positions when candidates can commit to post-election policies. This is due to
the fact that electoral prospects can be increased discontinuously by moving closer to the median
voter’s most preferred policy. If the other alternative is located there, any other position would
result in a certain loss come election day. In probabilistic voting models with policy-motivated
candidates, there is no convergence if they cannot commit to specific post-election policies since
15See e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a survey.
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voters can figure out that after the election they have no incentive to pursue any policy other
than their most preferred one. Hence, promises to the contrary are not credible. However, if such
commitment is possible there will be partial convergence because candidates will trade oﬀ the
loss from having to implement a policy that is less than perfect from their perspective against
the gain from increasing the probability of being able to choose policies instead of the opponent,
who has other ideological proclivities. Here, even though the political alternatives are assumed
not to be able to make binding election promises, and so will not by themselves bring about
neither full nor partial convergence of positions, donor influence can result in either.
Returning to the model, let us say that the electorate is R-leaning if p0 > 0.5 and S-leaning if
p0 < 0.5. The impact of aid on the probability that R wins the election may now be summarised
as follows:
Proposition 2
In the case of α > βR > βS, the eﬀect of aid on the likelihood that an R-government comes
to power depends on the the amount of resources the donor possesses relative to the recipient
country government:
a) When A ≤ AS, aid has no impact on p.
b) When A ∈
³
A
S
, A
R
´
, playing the aid game reduces p.
c) When A ≥ AR, D’s involvement reduces p if the electorate is R-leaning, increases it if
voters are S-leaning, and leaves it unaﬀected if none of the political alternatives has an electoral
advantage when no aid is given.
We also have
Corollary 1
If p0 ≥ 0.5, then p (A) ≤ p0 ∀A > 0.
That is, only in the special case where p0 < 0.5 and A ≥ A
R
does D strenghten R’s chances of
winning the election. This must be considered a special case, not only because it probably takes
a lot of resources for D to achieve complete control over outcomes but also because it seems
highly detrimental to the long-run development of democracy in the recipient country. Why
would anyone bother to run for oﬃce, let alone vote, when D is eﬀectively running the country’s
aﬀairs?16 This cannot be expected to be a stable long-run outcome. In the more realistic case of
16Of course, if there are non-policy benefits from being in power (due to e.g. valuing power for its own sake,
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partial donor influence on outcomes, we have an unambiguous conclusion: the involvement of D
reduces the probability that its preferred political alternative comes to power.
5 The Case of the “Moderate” Donor
What happens when D is a “moderate”, its preferences being intermediate to the two potential
recipient country governments, i.e., βR > α > βS? Recall that in deriving the critical values of
aid we are asking two questions: When can D overfund its “favourite” good - the good for which
it has the strongest relative preference - according to j’s tastes? When can D secure the optimal
level of provision of it? As the game played if S is in power is the same as the one just discussed,
the answers to these questions are obviously not aﬀected by the change in the assumption on
preferences. However, the second critical value of A now needs to be indexed by j because the
corresponding cut-oﬀ rate will in this case be diﬀerent if the game is played between D and
R. The roles of D and R are reversed, with the latter now seeking a share of g1 in C that is
higher than the “first-best” level from the former’s perspective. Accordingly, the critical level of
the aid budget below which R controls the outcome of the game is defined by A = gR∗2 , yielding
A
R
=
³
1−βR
βR
´
B. The second cut-oﬀ rate may be calculated fromA = gD∗2 ⇔ A =
¡
1−α
α
¢
B ≡ A
R
.
Post-election outcomes still depend on the relative budgets of D and j, but assuming βR >
α > βS only ensures that A
j
> A
j
. The ranking of the cut-oﬀ rates across aid games is now
not uniquely pinned down. The reason is that, loosely speaking, the game is played in diﬀerent
dimensions with each possible government. Not only is the answer to the first question dependent
on the type of government that is in power, D also has a diﬀerent “favourite” good in the two
games: g2 if it interacts with R, g1 if its opponent is S. Formally, β
R > α > βS implies 1−
βS > 1− βR, but AR R AS ⇔ 1− βS R βR. And the answer to the second question in this case
also hinges on whether D plays R or S: A
R
R A
S
⇔ 1
2
R α.
The fact that the ranking of the cut-oﬀ rates is not unique in this case means that the
political impact of aid is more complex. Potentially, there are two new real electoral alternatives.
Firstly, when α 6= 1
2
, either A
R
> A
S
or A
R
< A
S
. In both cases GD∗ is a Nash-equilibrium
lavish salaries, or possibilities of corruption), there would still be candidates for oﬃce. But this would do nothing
to entice voters to take the trip to the polling stations.
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outcome under one of the types of recipient government for levels of A between these two critical
values. Hence, if this type wins the election outcomes correspond to those that would occur if
a government with the same preferences as D - a D-government - was unilaterally deciding on
how to allocate C. Secondly, when A ∈
·
A
R
, A
R
¸
GN (R) = {B,A}. In analogy with Lemma 2
we then have
Lemma 4
When the Nash-equilibrium outcome under an R-government is {B,A}, it is equivalent to a
ρ-government. The weight ρ attaches to the utility of consuming g1 is β
ρ (A) = BC ∈
£
α, βR
¤
,
with ∂β
ρ(A)
∂A < 0.
Of course, it is still the case that if D enters the game with a large enough relative budget all
voters are indiﬀerent to the type of government elected. This is now true forA ≥Max
½
A
R
, A
S
¾
.
Thus in the following I mainly focus on situations where A < Max
½
A
R
, A
S
¾
. Table 2 lists the
possible true political alternatives facing voters when A takes on values for which the election
process is meaningful, as well as νI (A) and ∂ν
I(A)
∂A in each case.
[Table 2 about here]
The values of νI (A) follows from the fact that the indiﬀerent voter must be someone with
preferences intermediate to those of the true electoral choices. In turn, these are found by noting
that for A < A
j
the choice j listed on the ballott is the real one, whereas it is represented
by ρ or σ, as the case may be, for A ∈
·
A
j
, A
j
¶
and equivalent to D when A > A
j
. Since
all voters are indiﬀerent between R and S for A > Max
½
A
R
, A
S
¾
there are eight possible
combinations of true election alternatives for which νI (A) is defined (three times three minus
one). For example, when A ≤ Min
n
A
R
, A
S
o
, aid has no impact on outcomes under either
“oﬃcial” alternative. Therefore, the choices presented to voters at the polling stations are the
real ones and so νI (A) = νI0. More generally, whenever the true alternatives are “fixed”, ν
I (A)
is constant, whereas ∂ν
I(A)
∂A is non-zero whenever a change in A alters outcomes under one of
them. The special case of ρ vs. σ yields outomes of {B,A} and {A,B}, respectively, making the
true alternatives mirror images of one another.17 Hence, only someone putting equal weight on
the utility derived from each of the two goods can be indiﬀerent to them.
17This may also be deduced from the fact that βρ (A) = 1− βσ (A).
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Letting −j denote the other type of government, i.e., if j = S then −j = R, we can now
state the first results:
Proposition 3
If A
j ≤ A−j < A
−j
≤ A
j
,
∂|νI(A)−βj|
∂A ≥ 0. Then j’s electoral prospects are not hurt by
increases in A on
·
0,Max
½
A
R
, A
S
¾¶
.
Corollary 2
If A
j ≤ A−j < A
−j
≤ A
j
, with at least one inequality strict, ∃ eA such that p (A) > p0
∀A ∈
µ eA,Max½AR, AS¾¶ for j = R and p (A) < p0 ∀A ∈ µ eA,Max½AR, AS¾¶ for j = S.
In plain English: the best possible ranking of cut-oﬀ rates in terms of winning the election
for type j is A
j
< A
−j
< A
−j
< A
j
. That is, it pays to be a type against which D rather
easily gains some influence over outcomes (i.e., to have a relatively low A
j
) but finds it harder
to dominate completely (i.e., to have a relatively high A
j
). This will create two segments of the
domain (
h
A
j
, A
−j
´
and
·
A
−j
, A
j
¶
) over which you are forced to converge towards the outcome
under the other type of government, moving νI (A) away from you. Recalling that in terms
of winning the election this is beneficial as it increases the likelihood that the median voter is
located on your side of νI (A), such a parameter configuration is advantageous to j. And as long
as the ranking of the two kinds of critical values is not reversed, at the very least your opponent
cannot gain politically from playing the post-election game with D for values of aid for which
the electoral process is still meaningful.
I now assume α > νI0, which amounts to saying that the preferences of a type R government
are more closely aligned with those of D in this case too.18 In this case, however, such an
assumption is not suﬃcient to ensure that donor influence will hurt R’s electoral prospects. This
is due to the above mentioned fact that R and S now play D in diﬀerent dimensions. In order
to make outcomes under the two preference configurations directly comparable, we will have to
do away with this additional aspect of the games played when the donor is a “moderate”. If we
18The case α < νI0 is analogous to α > νI0, the only change being the reversal of the roles of the two types
of recipient government. Also note that the results below go through if I make the alternative assumption
α > 12
³
βR + βS
´
. This would be equivalent to assuming that the Euclidean distance between GD∗ and GR∗
is smaller than that between GD∗ and GS∗, i.e., that the expansion paths of D and R are located closer in
{g1, g2}-space than those of D and S.
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do so, Proposition 4 follows:
Proposition 4
If βS = 1− βR, α > νI0, and p0 ≥ 0.5, then p (A) ≤ p0 ∀A > 0.
The assumption βS = 1 − βR equates the possibilities for D to have partial impact on
outcomes under the two types of government by locating them symmetrically around 1
2
= νI0.
Hence, A
S
= A
R
and the assumption α > νI0 then ensures that A
R
< A
S
. In this case it is easier
for D to gain complete control over outcomes when facing R, and so p (A) is decreasing in A on·
A
R
, A
S
¶
. Assuming that R is not at an electoral disadvantage if no aid is forthcoming means
that even when all voters are indiﬀerent between the two formal political alternatives R cannot
gain politically from playing the aid game.
The general lessons from this section and the last are thus first of all that whenever D has
at least some leverage over outcomes aid aﬀects the election outcome in a probabilistic sense19.
Secondly, other things being equal this tends to be to the disadvantage of the political alternative
in the recipient country that is closer to D politically.
6 Concluding Discussion
When discussing the links between foreign aid and recipient country politics, there are two
important questions that need to be addressed: Is donor influence feasible? Is it desirable? I
demonstrate that even in the absence of conditionality, donor influence is a theoretical possibility.
I have not explicitly modelled conditionality because it cannot be expected to work well. It
is clearly possible to design “contracts” which would hold governments to their participation
constraints,20 but there are no courts in which to enforce these. Thus one is left with the carrot
and stick of giving or withholding financial assistance. Whether such threats and promises are
19The only exception to this statement is for βS = 1− βR, α = 12 , and p0 = 0.5. For this knife-edge parameter
configuration AR = AS < A
R
= A
S
, and so p (A) = 0.5 ∀A ≥ 0. The reason is that in this special case α = νI0
and the two potential governments are symmetrically located around this point, making them converge towards
GD∗ at identical rates for A ∈
h
A,A
i
. Assuming α > νI0 rules out this possibility.
20On the design of formal aid contracts, see Azam and Laﬀont (2003), Pedersen (1995a,b), Svensson (2000b), and
Torsvik (2002). Killick (1998) discusses the principal-agent approach to multilateral lending based on an extensive
review of the empirical literature and new country case studies from South-East Asia and Latin-America.
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credible, and if credible, suﬃcient, to aﬀect policies in recipient countries must then be examined.
The literature on the Samaritan’s Dilemma in foreign aid leads one to conclude that on theoretical
grounds one should not expect this to be the case.21
Empirically, as mentioned in the introduction, reviews of the eﬀectiveness of conditional-
ity in inducing policy reform are generally negative. In a large cross-country sample, Burnside
and Dollar (2000) find that aid seems to have had little impact on economic policies in recip-
ient countries.22 Relying on case studies, Killick (1998: 171-172) reaches a similar conclusion:
“[D]omestic political forces normally carry the day in decisions about economic policy.”23 These
findings have contributed to an emerging consensus expressed well by the following quotation
from Dollar and Svensson (1998: 4): “[T]he role of adjustment lending is to identify reformers
not to create them.”24
While not directly contradicting the potential benefits of aid selectivity, my results provide a
cautionary note to donors seeking them. First of all, neither conclusions based on averages nor
general impressions from specific country studies rule out contrarian findings in some countries
at some points in time.25 More importantly, if donors starts to apply aid selectivity, and there
is some evidence that this is the case (see Dollar and Levin 2004), for given total budgets some
21See e.g. Hagen (2003), Pedersen (1996, 2001) and Svensson (2000b).
22Admittedly, much can be said about the construction of their “policy index”, consisting of measures of infla-
tion, budget surplus, and trade openness, even beyond the obvious that strictly speaking none of the components
are policy variables.
23This viewed is also echoed by Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren (2001b: 34-35) in their summary of a set
of African case studies: “All of the case studies agree that economic policy is primarily driven by domestic
politics, not by outside agents. [...] In the pre-reform phase in which the government is not committed to reform,
conditional loans have generally been a farce in which the government agrees to measures it does not believe in
as a way to get funding, fail to carry them out, and then receives the funding from donors anyway.”
24These authors consider a range of political variables such as regime type and degree of political instability, as
well as input variables under the control of the World Bank (e.g. amount of resources allocated to loan preparation
and supervision). They find that the former predicts reform success (as defined by the Operations Evaluation
Department of the Bank) in a sample of adjustment loans made by the World Bank, while there is no connection
between the latter and outcomes.
25In a panel of recipient countries, Hagen and Hatlebakk (2003) do find that some donors seem to have influenced
levels of social spending. Devarajan, Dollar, Holmgren (2001b) also claim that in some circumstances aid aﬀects
policies.
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recipients must be receiving more assistance. The current emphasis on reaching the Millenium
Development Goals may also lead to higher total levels of aid.26 According to my model, it is
then more likely that we will see donor influence over outcomes and thus to lower probabilities
of winning elections for governments with the intention of pursuing policies more to the donors’
liking than their political opponents.
Of course, it is diﬃcult to predict whether this will happen as it requires intimate knowledge
of the political economy of each recipient country. But this is in any case inherent to the pursuit
of a strategy of aid selectivity. Governments change, particularly in low-income countries, which
are more unstable politically than high-income countries. Sometimes, and more regularly in
recent years, this is by democratic means. It is therefore not only the intentions of the current
government that must be probed, the path of likely governments must be forecasted. This requires
a greater understanding of the political economy of recipient countries - e.g. how interests are
organised, the ideology of the main parties, and the electoral system - in order to be able to
predict the impact of aid on the distribution of income among politically influential groups, the
support of political parties, and, ultimately, what policies will be adopted, implemented, and
sustained in the domestic political equilibrium.27 This paper constitutes but a small part of such
a research project, to which I hope to contribute in the future.
7 Appendix: Political Equilibrium with Aid
Proof of Lemma 1
Let ∆V i = U i
¡
GN (R)
¢
− U i
¡
GN (S)
¢
be voter i’s utility diﬀerential from having R in
power instead of S. The indiﬀerent voter is defined by ∆V i ≡ 0⇔ νI0 ln gR∗1 +
¡
1− νI0
¢
ln gR∗2 =
νI0 ln g
S∗
1 +
¡
1− νI0
¢
ln gS∗2 . Using (3b) in the main text to replace g
j∗
k and rearranging yields the
26Devarajan, Miller, and Swanson (2002) estimate that compared to 2000 oﬃcial aid needs to be roughly
doubled if the goals are to be met by the target date of 2015.
27It should be noted that policy choice is a function not only of political preferences, but of beliefs about the
links between policies and outcomes. Beliefs might change even when ideologies do not, whether on the basis of
accumulated experience or through persuasion. So even when buying influence is too costly, careful analysis of
where to put one’s bets in combination with a policy dialogue based on long-standing relationships might enable
donors to make a diﬀerence.
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expression for νI0 stated in the lemma. To see that ν
I
0 ∈
¡
βS, βR
¢
, first note that for νi = βR, we
must have ∆V i > 0 while for νi = βS it must be the case that ∆V i < 0. Moreover,
(A1a)
∂∆V i
∂νi
=
£
lnβR − lnβS
¤
+
£
ln
¡
1− βS
¢
− ln
¡
1− βR
¢¤
> 0; (A1a)
(A1b)
∂2∆V i
∂ (νi)2
= 0. (A1b)
Hence, the value of νi such that ∆V I = 0, which I denote by νI0, lies between βS and βR.
Assuming
£
βS, βR
¤
⊆ [ν, ν] is suﬃcient to ensure νI0 ∈ (ν, ν). For future reference, note that
straightforward calculations show that νI0 T 12 ⇔ β
S T 1− βR. QED.
Proof of Lemma 2
The “virtual” representative of S in operation for A ∈
h
A
S
, A
R
i
is denoted by σ and defined
to be the kind of government that would have optimally chosen the Nash-equilibrium outcome
generated under an S-government if it could determine the allocation of C on its own. Since
gN1 (S) = A for such values ofA, the preferences of σ can be derived from β
σC = A⇔ βσ (A) = AC .
We thus have ∂β
σ(A)
∂A =
B
C2 > 0. It is easily checked that β
σ
³
A
S
´
= βS and βσ
³
A
R
´
= βR. By
assumption βR > βS. It follows that βσ (A) ∈
£
βS, βR
¤
. QED.
Proof of Lemma 3
For A ∈
h
A
S
, A
R
´
, νI (A) is defined by U I
¡
GN (R)
¢
= U I
¡
GR∗
¢
≡ U I (Gσ∗), i.e., it is
the weight placed on the utility of private consumption by the voter who is indiﬀerent between
electing R (which will see its optimal allocation of C realised if it comes to power) and S
(represented by σ). Using the procedure applied in the proof of Lemma 1 one can verify that
νI (A) is given by the expression in Lemma 3 and that νI (A) ∈
¡
βσ (A) , βR
¢
, ∀A ∈
h
A
S
, A
R
´
.
The derivative of νI (A) with respect to A is
∂νI (A)
∂A
=

 1
ln β
R
βσ + ln
(1−βσ)
(1−βR)

 ∂β
σ
∂A
·
νI
βσ
− 1− ν
I
1− βσ
¸
, (A2)
which is positive ∀A ∈
h
A
S
, A
R
´
since νI (A) ∈
¡
βσ (A) , βR
¢
and ∂β
σ(A)
∂A > 0. We have
lim
A→AR
νI (A) = lim
A→AR
1
1−βσ
1
βσ +
1
1−βσ
= βR. (A3)
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QED.
Proof of Proposition 2
p (A) is obviously constant when νI (A) is. For A < A
S
, p (A) = p
¡
νI0
¢
≡ p0. For A ≥ A,
all voters are indiﬀerent. They are then assumed to flip fair coins to decide which alterna-
tive to vote for, resulting in p (A) = 0.5. For A ∈
h
A
S
, A
R
´
, ∂ν
I(A)
∂A > 0 and ν
I (A) ∈¡¡
βσ (A) , βR
¢¢
⊂ [ν, ν] (c.f. proof of Lemma 3). By assumption m (z) > 0 ∀z ∈ [ν, ν]. Hence,
∂p(A)
∂A = −m
¡
νI (A)
¢ ∂νI(A)
∂A < 0. QED.
Proof of Corollary 1
It is immediate from Proposition 2 that in this case p (A) = p0 > 0.5 when A < A
S
, declines
towards 0.5 on
h
A
S
, A
R
´
, and equals 0.5 for A ≥ A. QED.
Proof of Lemma 4
A ρ-government is defined by Gρ∗ = {B,A}, the Nash-equilibrium outcome for j = R when
D has partial influence over outcomes. Thus βρC = B ⇔ βρ (A) = BC and
∂βρ(A)
∂A = −
B
C2 < 0.
Note that βρ (A) = 1− βσ (A) and ∂β
ρ(A)
∂A = −
∂βσ(A)
∂A . QED.
Proof of Proposition 3
From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that sign ∂p(A)∂A = −sign
∂νI(A)
∂A . As the probability
that S wins is 1 − p (A), sign ∂[1−p(A)]∂A = sign
∂νI(A)
∂A . For A ≤ Min
n
A
j
, A
−j
o
νI (A) = νI0.
νI (A) is also constant for A ∈
·
Max
n
A
j
, A
−j
o
,Min
½
A
j
, A
−j
¾¸
; specifically, the true political
alternatives are then ρ and σ (see Table 2) and so νI (A) = 1
2
(since βρ (A) = 1 − βσ (A), c.f.
Proof of Lemma 4). In both of these cases,
∂|νI(A)−βj|
∂A = 0. This completes the proof when
A
j
= A
−j
and A
j
= A
−j
. If j = S and A
S
< A
R
, then
∂|νI(A)−βj|
∂A =
∂νI(A)
∂A > 0 for A ∈
h
A
S
, A
R
´
.
Similarly, If j = S and A
R
< A
S
, then
∂|νI(A)−βj|
∂A =
∂νI(A)
∂A > 0 for A ∈
·
A
R
, A
S
¶
. In both
situations S is represented by σ and βσ (A) moves towards the fixed position of R (βR in the
first case, α in the second) as A, and hence 1 − p (A), goes up. A corresponding analysis for
j = R establishes that p (A) is increasing on
h
A
R
, A
S
´
and
·
A
S
, A
R
¶
because for such parameter
values νI (A) is decreasing over these intervals. QED.
Proof of Corollary 2
Follows directly from the proof of Proposition 3, with eA = A−j if Aj < A−j and Aj ≤ A−j
and eA = A−j if Aj = A−j and A−j < Aj. QED.
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Proof of Proposition 4
In the proof of Lemma 2 it was established that νI0 T 12 ⇔ β
S T 1 − βR. So βS = 1 − βR
is equivalent to both A
S
= A
R
and νI0 =
1
2
. Hence assuming α > νI0 in this case implies α >
1
2
and we have A
S
> A
R
. It follows that p (A) = p0 for A < A
R
and then declines over
·
A
R
, A
S
¶
as νI (A) rises (c.f. the proofs of propositions 2 and 3). Finally, by assumption p0 ≥ 0.5 = p (A)
∀A ≥ A
S
. QED.
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Figure 1: Regional averages of democracy 
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Figure 2: Nash-equilibrium outcomes as functions of the aid budget 
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 Figure 3: Convergence of outcomes under R- and S-governments, SR ββα >>  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Aid and Elections 
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 Table 1: Nash-equilibrium outcomes under different types of governments, SR ββα >>  
A/j R S 
[ ]SA,0  { }*2*1 , RR gg  { }*2*1 , SS gg  
( ]RS AA ,  { }*2*1 , RR gg  { }BA,  ( ]AA R ,  { }BA,  { }BA,  
A>  { }*2*1 , DD gg  { }*2*1 , DD gg  
 
 
Table 2: Properties of νI(A) for possible electoral alternatives, SR βαβ >>  
Real electoral 
alternatives 
A νI(A) 
A
I
∂∂ν  
R vs. S { }SR AAMin ,<  I0ν  0 
R vs. σ [ )RS AA ,  ( )( )RA ββ σ ,  + 
R vs. D 

 RS AA ,  ( )Rβα ,  0 
ρ vs. S [ )SR AA ,  ( )( )AS ρββ ,  - 
ρ vs. σ { }  
SR
SR AAMinAAMax ,,,
1/2 0 
ρ vs. D 

 RS AA ,  ( )( )Aρβα ,  - 
D vs. S 

 SR AA ,  ( )αβ ,S  0 
D vs. σ 

 SR AA ,  ( )( )αβ σ ,A  + 
 
 
